The Limited Corruption in First-Price Sealed Auctions-Experimental Evidence

摘要：

Based on the firstprice sealedbid auction model of limited corruption including risk aversion and risk neutral, parallel experiments have been conducted through LAN, with the purpose of testing the predictive ability of the model, as well as observing the efficiency of the firstprice sealedbid auction and the way that bidders behave in the presence of limited corruption. The study finds that mechanism of limited corruption has no effect on the efficiency of auction and the corruptors tend to be risk averse.

关键词： first-pricesealed-bidauction limtiedcorruption experiment risk attitudes

作者: Li Jianbiao Wang Minda Li Wei

作者单位: The Reserch Center of CorporateGovernance of Nankai UniversityTianjin, China The Reserch Center of Corporate Governance of Nankai University Tianjin, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2011 International Conference on Business Management and Electronic Information(2011商业管理与电子信息国际学术会议 BMEI2011)

会议地点: 广州

会议语种:英文

页码: 1-3

在线出版日期: 2011-05-13（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）