Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Differentiated Goods and Endogenous Spillovers

摘要：

The paper analyzes a three stage game of R&D where duopoly are engaged in costreducing innovation. In the model, the spillovers of information are treated endogenous and the goods is differentiated at the same time. It is shown if the R&D stage is noncooperative, the firms will never disclose their information when goods is substituted and completely disclose their information when goods is complementary; if the R&D stage is cooperative, no matter the goods is substituted or complementary, the firms always disclose their information.

关键词： R&Dduopoly Differentiatedgoods Endogenous spillovers

作者: Dai Jugui Dai Jugui

作者单位: School of Business,Wenzhou University, UniverstityPark,Wenzhou City,Zhejiang Province,China, PR School of International Business Administration, Shanghai University of Finance & Economics, Guoding

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2011 International Conference on Business Management and Electronic Information(2011商业管理与电子信息国际学术会议 BMEI2011)

会议地点: 广州

会议语种:英文

页码: 1-4

在线出版日期: 2011-05-13（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）