The Excess Control of Ultimate Controlling Shareholders and Corporation Investment:Empirical Evidence from Chinese Capital Market
By taking the data on China’s listed companies from 2002 to 2006, this paper investigate the effect of ultimate controlling shareholders on investment decision. The results show that, as for ultimate controlling shareholders of private firms, the higher the divergence between the cashflow rights and the control rights is, the more serious is the underinvestment because of tunneling activities. The negative effects of agent problem on investment inefficiency are mainly in firms of the lower cashflow rights. Furthermore, the results show that the high preference of cash holdings may be the mechanism resulting in underinvestment for ultimate controlling shareholders. However, all these conclusions may fail to explain some phenomena in the stateowned firms. This research gives a useful reference to understanding the disputation of privatization to improve efficiency from the view of investment. What is more, it also gives further complement to the theory of investment in developing countries.
cash-flow rights controlling rights investment ultimate controlling shareholders
Cheng Zhong-ming Zhang Yong
School of Economics,Management, Xinning University XNU, Hubei, P.R.China, 437100 Research Institute School of Economics and Management, Suzhou University SZU, Anhui, P.R.China, 234000
国际会议
广州
英文
1-4
2011-05-13（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）