会议专题

The Excess Control of Ultimate Controlling Shareholders and Corporation Investment:Empirical Evidence from Chinese Capital Market

By taking the data on China’s listed companies from 2002 to 2006, this paper investigate the effect of ultimate controlling shareholders on investment decision. The results show that, as for ultimate controlling shareholders of private firms, the higher the divergence between the cashflow rights and the control rights is, the more serious is the underinvestment because of tunneling activities. The negative effects of agent problem on investment inefficiency are mainly in firms of the lower cashflow rights. Furthermore, the results show that the high preference of cash holdings may be the mechanism resulting in underinvestment for ultimate controlling shareholders. However, all these conclusions may fail to explain some phenomena in the stateowned firms. This research gives a useful reference to understanding the disputation of privatization to improve efficiency from the view of investment. What is more, it also gives further complement to the theory of investment in developing countries.

cash-flow rights controlling rights investment ultimate controlling shareholders

Cheng Zhong-ming Zhang Yong

School of Economics,Management, Xinning University XNU, Hubei, P.R.China, 437100 Research Institute School of Economics and Management, Suzhou University SZU, Anhui, P.R.China, 234000

国际会议

2011 International Conference on Business Management and Electronic Information(2011商业管理与电子信息国际学术会议 BMEI2011)

广州

英文

1-4

2011-05-13(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)