Managing E-Channel Profits: Signaling Quality By Selling Through A Reputable Retailer

摘要：

A channel of distribution consists of different channel members each having his decision. The focus of this paper is giving an example of renting the reputation of another agent to signal quality. In this paper, the author shows that a “maximally separating equilibrium, manufacturers of high quality products distribute through retailers with strong reputation, while manufacturers of low quality products distribute through retailers with no reputation. In this way, even if high quality manufacturers have no reputation of their own, they can signal quality by posting the reputation of the retailers.

关键词： Distribution signalquality channelcoordination

作者: Huei-Chen Hsu Yunlin

作者单位: Department of Marketing ManagementTransWorld University Taiwan, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2011 International Conference on Business Management and Electronic Information(2011商业管理与电子信息国际学术会议 BMEI2011)

会议地点: 广州

会议语种:英文

页码: 1-3

在线出版日期: 2011-05-13（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）