Corporate Governance,Free Cash Flow and Over-investment

摘要：

Through further analysis of free cash flow and overinvestment and from the point of Corporate Governance, this paper establishes the model of shareholder, director board and supervisory board to the overinvestment of manager. The relationship among Corporate Governance, free cash flow and overinvestment is examined. The results of this study has findings that shareholder, director board and supervisory board not effective restrict the overinvestment of manager.

关键词： freecashflow over-investment Corporate Governance growthopportunity

作者: Liping Yu Lijun Li

作者单位: School of Business AdministrationNortheastern UniversityShenyang ,China School of Business Administration Northeastern University Shenyang ,China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2011 International Conference on Business Management and Electronic Information(2011商业管理与电子信息国际学术会议 BMEI2011)

会议地点: 广州

会议语种:英文

页码: 1-5

在线出版日期: 2011-05-13（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）