The Survival of Agency Heads in the Public Sector: Insiders versus Outsiders in UK Central Government Agencies
Prior organisational performance and political change influence public sector chief executives’ length of tenure in public organisations. However, the influence of chief executives’ origins as organisational or public sector insiders, or alternatively outsiders in these terms, has not been examined. Our theory suggests that insiders are more adept at survival because of their experience working in public organisations. In the context of UK government executive agencies, we assess if chief executive ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’ background to the individual agency, central government or broader public sector (as opposed to private firms or charities) influences tenure length. We use a newly created panel of all UK central government executive agencies and the turnover of their chief executives in the period 1989-2012. Our analysis uses Cox proportional hazard models with length of tenure as a dependent variable and independent variables of insider/outsider background, agency performance, political change, other aspects of chief executives’ backgrounds and differences in agencies’ functions and resources. Preliminary results suggest insider/outsider background is not influential, perhaps suggesting the need to disaggregate ‘push’ and ‘pull’ forms of tenure which may be differently related to managerial origin.
Oliver James Nicolai Petrovsky Alice Moseley George A. Boyne
University of Exeter University of Kentucky Cardiff University
国际会议
上海
英文
1-21
2012-05-25（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）