The Institutional Logic of Local Innovation: An Analysis of Anticorruption Initiatives in Guangdong Province Province
Corruption has posed a grave challenge to the governing capacity of the Chinese state. Since the onset of reform in the early 1980s, the Chinese government has engaged in an intensive anticorruption war in order to cope with it. The crusade against corruption aims not only to defend public integrity but also to strengthen the legitimation of the regime, as the leaders are fully aware that “if we don’t fight corruption, we will lose our power to rule. The Party will then be destroyed by itself (Shao, 2009). For decades, a top-down campaign-style strategy was employed to rein in “unhealthy tendencies (a euphemism for corruption in the Chinese official terminology). Periodic yet tempestuous organizational purges were launched to crack down on corruption, accompanied by draconian penalties against corrupt officials. The central government also enacted numerous anticorruption rules and regulations and considerably empowered its watchdogs to carry out authoritative fiats in recent years (Gong & Ren, forthcoming 2013). However, the bold promise to build government integrity proves far more difficult to keep and anticorruption reform seems more complex to accomplish than anticipated. As yet, there is no evidence to suggest that the government’s anticorruption efforts have been effective, but rather that corruption has continued to go viral.
Ting Gong
Department of Public and Social Administration City university of Hong Kong Kowloon, Hong Kong SAR
国际会议
上海
英文
1-19
2012-05-25（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）