The managerial models of social housing some evidence from Italy
The work examines the managerial models of social housing in Italy in order to understand what model guarantees the best performances and what the context conditions and the variables are that allow its efficient and effective management. Agency and Stewardship theories are used as a framework to examine how the sector is managed. Managers are classified as either agents or stewards on the basis of their goals, size, contractual power and nature (for profit or non-profit). Moreover, the tools used in the contract relationships are investigated, performances are analyzed and the hypothesis that a steward relationship allows the managerial results to be maximized in the social housing sector is tested. A case study methodology is applied. Five cases have been selected (the municipalities of Bologna, Florence, Genoa, Milan and Turin) and data on a period of three years (2008 -2010) have been collected. The results show that principal-agent relationships are difficult to implement with negative impacts on performances. Where risk-sharing mechanisms are only money-based, the results are not as positive as expected. Moreover, formal monitoring mechanisms positively affects performances, however, informal mechanisms are appreciated and they are used in order to monitor activities with a more social purpose. The research provides further evidence that social services, in this case social housing, have to be managed carefully. Finally, the present work can be used by policy-makers to better codify both the managers selection and contract process in the social housing sector.
agency theory stewardship theory social housing performances.
Giuseppe Catalano Francesco Rizzitelli
Department of Information Engineering, Electronics and Telecommunications Department of Management, Economics & Industrial Engineering.
国际会议
上海
英文
1-33
2012-05-25（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）