Security Game between Source and Friendly Relay

摘要：

In this paper, we investigate a four terminal Gaussian network which is composed of a destination, a source, an eavesdropper and a friendly relay which helps the source to increase the secrecy capacity. We introduce a game theoretic approach in which the source pays the relay for increasing the secrecy capacity. The relay charges the source with a certain price, and there is a tradeoff for the price. If the price is too high, the source would not buy the “service，but if the price is too low the profit of the relay is low. In modeling the outcome of the above games we use Stackelberg type of game. In our work we prove the existence of the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game. Simulation results and analysis show the effectiveness of the relay and the tradeoff of the price.

关键词： secrecy capacity game theoretic stackelberg equilibrium

作者: Zhang Maorui Wang Bao-yun

作者单位: College of Communication and Information Engineering,Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunicati College of Automation, Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Nanjing, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2011年无线通信与信号处理国际会议(WCSP 2011)

会议地点: 南京

会议语种:英文

页码: 1-6

在线出版日期: 2011-11-09（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）