Ef.cient Auction Mechanisms for Carbon Emission Rights Allocation

摘要：

This paper examines bidders?bidding behavior and carbon emission rights allocations under the English auction with 揼oing, going, gone?ending rule and the sequential ascending auction, respectively. Given the de.nitions of demand correspondence and ef.cient allocation, we obtain that: (1) under the English auction with 揼oing, going, gone?ending rule, the straightforward bidding strategy is dominant in the sense that it makes bidders avoid the risk of loss, and the bidding strategy leads to an ef.cient assignment; (2) under the sequential ascending auction, truth-telling is the most preferred bidding strategy to bidders, and it is an ef.cient allocation strategy; (3) from the respective of bidders, the Revenue Equivalence Theorem still holds in our models. Thus, this paper provides two ef.cient auction formats for carbon emission rights allocation.

关键词： Carbon emission rights auction bidding strategy efficient allocation

作者: Mingxi Wang Bianling Ou Mingrong Wang Shouyang Wang

作者单位: School of International Trade and EconomicsUniversity of International Business and Economics, Beiji Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China School of Economics, Capital University of Business and Economics, Beijing 100070, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2011 Fourth International Conference on Business Intelligence and Financial Engineering(第四届商务智能与金融工程国际会议 BIFE2011)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 340-344

在线出版日期: 2011-10-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）