A Game Analysis of the Supervision Model for Preventing Tunneling Behavior in China’s Family Firms

摘要：

Recently, it has become a hot issue to prevent the controlling family from tunneling listed companies. This paper aims to apply the analytical framework of the collusion theory to conduct the research onto the tunneling behavior in family firms. With the use of game theory, a supervision model for preventing tunneling behavior is established and some countermeasures are proposed.

关键词： Game Analysis Supervision Model Family Firms

作者: Shen minghao Tang jing

作者单位: Center for Cantonese Merchants Research, GuangdongUniversity of Foreign Studies Guangdong University School of business ,administration, South China University of Technology, Guangdong University of Fo

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2011 Fourth International Conference on Business Intelligence and Financial Engineering(第四届商务智能与金融工程国际会议 BIFE2011)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 345-348

在线出版日期: 2011-10-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）