Evolutionary Game Analysis of Supervision Strategy for Behavior of Public Institution Leaked Customers Information
So many public institutions have leaked customers information in resent years. Those brought losses to customers. The supervision strategy for behavior of public institution leaked customers information is a complicated system project. Evolution game theory is adopted to build the model of supervision. This paper gives the mixed regulatory strategy. What s more the Nash equilibrium solution and its economic significance are also showed in it. Finally this paper puts forward some policy suggestions to supervise those actions. Governing that behavior of public institutions needs all persons make great efforts together. It is not only increasing the amount publish to the monitoring body and establishing a sound law protection system, but also strengthening the customers self-protection consciousness of personal information.
Public Institution Information Supervision Evolutionary Game
Jin Su Jianyong Zhou
Collage of Management, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093
国际会议
武汉
英文
349-352
2011-10-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）