ENTRY AND EXIT DECISIONS IN A SYMMETRIC DUOPOLY OPTION GAME MODEL

摘要：

How many subsidies can cause firms to enter and exit is an interesting question. Different from the existing literature, the option game theory is applied to construct a symmetric duopoly model of investment with entry and exit decisions under uncertainty in this paper. As a result, the relation between entry and exit optimal thresholds and subsidies is shown. Moreover, the equilibrium strategies corresponding subsidies are given.

关键词： investment strategy option game entry and exit subsidy

作者: Li Gong Jin Tian

作者单位: Institute of China InnovationEast China Normal Univ.Shanghai, China National Key Lab. of Science and Technology on Antennas and Microwaves Xidian Univ. Shaanxi, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2011 Fourth International Conference on Business Intelligence and Financial Engineering(第四届商务智能与金融工程国际会议 BIFE2011)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 591-593

在线出版日期: 2011-10-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）