Game Analysis on Reputation Signals Restricting the Adverse Selection from Alliance Partners

摘要：

Cooperative reputation reveals the inherent characteristics of business and has signaling functions.Game analysis shows that the reputation of alliance partners can lead to the separation of alliance partner selection game balance.Additionally, the chief judge for the reputation of potential partners is selecting the appropriate state coalition partner, which can eliminate the restrictc of behavior adverse selection and improve the efficiency of strategic alliances.

关键词： corporate reputation signaling alliance partners adverse selection

作者: ZHAO Liang FU Jia-lin

作者单位: School of Law and Administration Xu Chang College,Xu Chang,China Zhengzhou University of Light industry Economic and Management School,Zhengzhou,China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2011 IEEE International Conference on Grey System and Intelligent Services Joint with the 15th WOSC International Congress on Cybernetics and System(2011 IEEE灰色系统与智能服务国际会议暨系统与控制世界组织第15届年会)

会议地点: 南京

会议语种:英文

页码: 167-169

在线出版日期: 2011-09-15（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）