A Dynamic Game Model for the Formation of the Farmers Reputation in the Rural Credit Market

摘要：

The farmers reputation can present their intrinsic character, which has the role in signaling and screening information for the decision-makings from both borrowing and lending in the rural credit market.As a village can be considered as a unit of rural social networks, the formation of the farmers reputation is a Bayesian adjustment.Hence, dynamic game model is used and showed that the farmers behavior is the most fundamental factor for formation of the farmers* reputation, which is dynamic.Moreover, the current reputation is an overall people perception, which is based on the results of previous farmers behavior, and current behavior will affect the next farmers perception for the farmers, which can form the new reputation level.

关键词： credit market farmers reputation dynamic game model

作者: HUANG Xiao-hong

作者单位: Economic and Management School Zhengzhou University of Light industry,Zhengzhou,China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2011 IEEE International Conference on Grey System and Intelligent Services Joint with the 15th WOSC International Congress on Cybernetics and System(2011 IEEE灰色系统与智能服务国际会议暨系统与控制世界组织第15届年会)

会议地点: 南京

会议语种:英文

页码: 787-789

在线出版日期: 2011-09-15（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）