Analysis of Government Procurement Based on Principal-agent Theory
Due to the asymmetric information phenomenon, the purchasing agencies of government procurement always have problems of rent-seeking to circumvent bidding and fraud issues. These issues lead to low efficiency of some local government procurement agencies. Start with the optimum efficiency of the minimum purchase amount of information, the dissertation provides constructive solutions through principal-agent theory and tripartite decision-making model: eliminated unless administrative monopoly, improved the system of principal-agent, to meet the purpose of reducing rent-seeking and restraining the corrupt behavior.
Government procurement Principal-agent Rent-seeking Tripartite decision-making model
TANG Shi-qian
School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, P.R. China, 230026
国际会议
2010 International Conference on Public Administration(6th)(2010 第六届公共管理国际会议)
澳大利亚堪培拉
英文
351-356
2010-10-22（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）