Combining Reputation and Punishment to Promote Cooperation
The results of a number of laboratory experiments indicate that costly punishment can uphold cooperation in public goods game (PGG). However, studies also suggest that high cooperation does not necessarily imply high earning in experiments with punishment. In this paper, we investigated the impacts of combining reputation with punishment on cooperation and then welfare. We reported a set of experiments in which a reputation is introduced to the standard PGG with punishment by disclosing subjects historical contributions. We also provided a robust examination by varying the effectiveness of punishment, which is the amount by which a punishment point reduces the recipients earning. Results showed that, when both mechanisms are introduced, contributions and overall earnings were significantly higher than when only punishment was available if the effectiveness of punishment exceeds a certain threshold, for introducing reputation could significantly enhance the performance of punishment not only by raising up the start point of individual contributions, but also by strengthening subjects response to punishment.
Costly punishment Reputation Public goods Effectiveness of punishment Side effect
FAN Liang-cong XU Bin
College of Public Administration, Zhejiang University, Zhejiang, P.R. China, 310027 School of Public Administration, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Zhejiang, P.R. China, 310018
国际会议
2010 International Conference on Public Administration(6th)(2010 第六届公共管理国际会议)
澳大利亚堪培拉
英文
832-839
2010-10-22（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）