Analyzing Real Estate’s Brand Protection Strategy Selections in China with Evolutionary Game
This paper considers the brand protection strategy selections between the real estate brand developers and the brand infringers in China with evolutionary game theory. By analyzing two groups’ evolutionary stable strategies, we find that developers’ low cost of brand protection, heavy punishment on the brand infringers’ brand torts, large probability of convicting a brand infringement, or the poor self-discipline of real estate market, can directly encourage developers to choose brand protection strategy while the brand infringers perform self-development. And brand infringers’ few profit as well as the high reputation cost can indirectly inspire developers’ brand protection by preventing brand infringers’ brand tort. Moreover, this paper throws light on the brand protection problem quantitatively rather than gives some qualitative suggestions and extends the traditional studies to be more practical.
real estate brand protection evolutionary game evolutionary stable strategy (ESS).
Lining JIANG Wentian CUI
School of Management, Xi’an JiaotongUniversity, Xi’an, China 710049 School of Management, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an, China 710049
国际会议
2011 International Conference on Construction & Real Estate Management(2011建设与房地产管理国际会议)
广州
英文
644-647
2011-11-19(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)