Third-Party Financial Intermediary and Supervision Innovation in Bank Credit-An Example of Asset Management Companies
We design a tripartite contract model of banks and enterprises and asset management companies, aiming at the financing dilemma of enterprises and the information disadvantage of asset management companies in traditional bank credit operations. It can alleviate moral hazard problems that asset management companies take part in and supervise corporate credit. By analyzing enterprises owned funds and the profits of investment of banks and asset management companies, we find the financing capacity of enterprises depends on enterprises owned funds and whether entrepreneurs are responsible. In the case of unchangeable investment projects, only those enterprises whose owned funds are sufficient can directly get bank financing, while others have to get finance through the tripartite contract. The financing process of enterprises should be supervised by asset management companies. Meanwhile, if asset management companies participate in traditional bank credit business, it can also alleviate excessive supervision problem when a single supervisor enjoys all the external residual claims of enterprises.
asset management companies bank credit tripartite contract
ZHANG Tao LI Wei CHEN Guanyu
Center for Studies of Corporate Governance/Business School, Nankai University, P.R.China
国际会议
2011 泉州技术管理研讨会(Quanzhou Conference on Management of Technology MOT2011)
福建泉州
英文
206-212
2011-04-16（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）