Collusion-proof Mechanism Design under Asymmetric Information in Engineering Supervision System
This paper investigate the collusion-proof incentive mechanism design under cost asymmetric information in engineering management, especially focus on the role of supervisor engineering in engineering supervision system. We show that employing an honest supervisor monitor the contractor can indeed improve the quality of project. We demonstrate also that even if employing a self-interested supervisor is inferior to an honest but better than no supervisor when the transaction cost is presence. Enhancing the monitoring intensity and punishment of collusion between the supervising engineer and the contractor can increase the transaction cost of collusion,so it is more efficiency to prevent the collusion and corruption in engineering management.
engineering supervision system asymmetric information adverse selection collusion-proof incentive mechanism design model of principal-supervisor-agent Bayesian theorem
Jianzhang LI
School of Management Chongqing Jiaotong University Chongqing, P.R. China
国际会议
重庆
英文
316-320
2011-09-23（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）