Supply chain competition with information sharing
Given the case of two competing supply chains each consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, we explore whether the retailers should share the market demand information they know with their manufacturers when the manufacturers do not know the same specific demand information. We also determine the optimal pricing policy and total profit for the retailers when each chain either shares or does not share market demand information. We find that sharing information is always more profitable for both retailer and supply chain.
Supply chain competition information asymmetry information sharing pricing competition
Rongyao He Zhongkai Xiong Yu Xiong
College of Economy and Business Administration, Chongqing University Queens University Management School, Queens University Belfast
国际会议
Fourth International Conference on Advanced Design and Manufacturing(第四届先进设计与制造国际会议)
昆明
英文
309-312
2011-09-21(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)