Supplier Selection Model Based on Two Stage Signal Game and Reputation Mechanism

摘要：

Asymmetric information will lead to adverse selection in the supplier selection in the supply. One the basis of game theory and information economics theories, a two stage supplier selection signal game reputation model is presented. The optimal price signal and utility of supplier are derived under symmetric and asymmetric information. The optimal signal of supplier will be strengthen and the utility at the second stage will also be increased if the supplier sets up reputation at the first stage, and it also shown that more utilities can be achieved when a supplier uses reputation.

关键词： Supply chain management Supplier selection Signal game Reputation mechanism Asymmetric information

作者: XinMA

作者单位: School of Management and Economics,North China University of Water Conservancy and Electric Power,Zhengzhou,China,450011

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: the 2011 International Conference on Key Engineering Materials(ICKEM 2011)(2011关键工程材料国际会议)

会议地点: 三亚

会议语种:英文

页码: 50-54

在线出版日期: 2011-03-25（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）