Ownership Structure, Moral Hazard and Bank Risk Taking
This study investigates the effects of large shareholding structure and moral hazard on bank risk taking. The empirical results, based on data of Malaysian banks do not support the hypothesis that large shareholders expropriate minority shareholders by increasing bank risk. In contrast, the presence of large shareholders in Malaysian banks is associated with low bank risk taking. Moral hazard activities are also found to be not significant in Malaysian banks. The results indicate that large ownership does not increase agency problems and risk taking. Agency hypothesis of the costs associated with having ownership concentration may not be applicable to Malaysian banking industry.
Ownership structure Moral hazard Bank risk taking
Nora Azureen Abdul Rahman Nor Hayati Ahmad Nur Adiana Hiau Abdullah
Finance and Banking Department Universiti Utara Malaysia Kedah,Malaysia Finance and Banking Department Universiti Utara Malaysia Kedah, Malaysia
国际会议
上海
英文
12-16
2011-03-11（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）