Analysis on incentive mechanism of human resources dispatching under moral hazard

摘要：

With the increasing of market competition, human dispatching service can reduce enterprises human resources cost But asymmetric information among principal, dispatching agency and dispatched workers may cause moral hazard of dispatching agency and dispatched workers. This paper considers moral hazard under asymmetric information. It researches the maximum problem of principals profit under the incentive compatibility constraints of considering dispatching agency and dispatched workers. Through model analysis it commissioned that principal can adjust the incentive coefficient in order to better motivate dispatching agency and dispatched workers, so that the requester to obtain more revenue.

关键词： human resources dispatching service moral hazard monetized effort cost incentive coefficient

作者: Yanli Yang XianYu Wang

作者单位: school of Business Administration. SiChuan university. Chengdu. P. R. China. 610064 school of jinche school of Business Administration. SiChuan university. Chengdu. P. R. China. 610064

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: Third International Symposium on Information Science and Engineering(第三届信息科学与工程国际会议 ISISE 2010)

会议地点: 上海

会议语种:英文

页码: 93-96

在线出版日期: 2010-12-24（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）