Study on the Conceptual Model of Matrix Games in Situations with Intentional Threats
In recent years there have been frequent occurrences of intentional threats, which have become a worldwide catastrophe risk. Intentional attacks involve attackers decision-making behaviors, so the study of decision-making behavior and strategic interaction between attackers and defenders will be required. In this paper, a conceptual model of matrix games in situations with intentional threats is developed to solve the problem of strategy selections. The features of intentional attacks are considered in this model, including the zero-sum property, strategy type matching and rational decision-making. Based on the conceptual model, some methods for mathematical modeling are proposed as good as the solving method under the postulate of complete rationality and the general framework of solution under the postulate of bounded rationality. Then we took an example and accomplished the modeling of the process of strategy selections. Finally, we found that the solution is consistent with the statistical data. This model can provide decision-makers with clues for macroscopic decision-making in responding to intentional threats.
Hu Xiaofeng Shen Shifei
Institute of Public Safety Research (IPSR) Department of Engineering Physics (DEP) Tsinghua University Beijing, China
国际会议
北京
英文
315-319
2011-09-23（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）