Investigations of Evolutionary Game between Individual Safety Behaviors and Stimulus Mechanism

摘要：

Beginning with bounded rationality, the evolutionary game model for staffs safety behavior and stimulus mechanism was established, and the duplicate dynamic equation and dynamic evolution equation of the game parties are derived. By performing stability analysis of the duplicate dynamic differentials, the evolution stability strategy for individual safety behavior and stimulus mechanism was obtained, and some suggestions were put forward to improve the habit of individual safety behavior from stimulus point of view.

作者: Nie Baisheng Hu Weixi Dai Linchao Zhang Ruining Zhao Caihong

作者单位: School of Resource & Safety Engineering China University of Mining & Technology (Beijing) State Key Laboratory of Coal Resource and Safe Mining Beijing, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The 1st International Symposium on Behavior-based Safety and Safety Management(第一届行为安全与安全管理国际会议 BSM in China 2011)

会议地点: 北京

会议语种:英文

页码: 419-423

在线出版日期: 2011-09-23（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）