The Impacts of Different Emission Tradable Permits Allocation Mechanism in Electronic Sector

摘要：

This paper explores the impacts of two allocation mechanisms (grandfathering and auctioning) in both ERCs (Emission Reduction Credits) and Allowance Systems on the marginal and average cost of producing electricity by using a simple theoretical model. The results indicate that the impacts of different allocation methods are very small in the Allowance System. However, in the ERC system, the impacts of different allocation methods depend on the changes in production behavior after initial purchasing permits. The auctioning with ERCs system is preferred because the polluting firms will produce more and benefits people with lower energy price. Chinese emission trading system may offer the permits with a combination of two mechanisms and any institutional changes of the emission trading system must be consistent with Chinese social development.

作者: Zhou Shouliang

作者单位: Dong Bei University of Finance & Economics

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2011 Academy for Global Business Advancement(AGBAs)8th World Congress(全球商务发展学会第八届国际会议)

会议地点: 大连

会议语种:英文

页码: 235-251

在线出版日期: 2011-09-15（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）