Research into Corporate Information Disclosure Internalizes: A Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Test

摘要：

Because the information disclosure contract cant be defined clear inevitably both to companies and to stock holders, the ownership of abnormal revenue in the term between information born and information disclosed cannot be completely and clearly defined. So with advantages in information, corporation management tries to grab the wealth. That is what is called an internality. In this paper, using case studies of corporate annual reports publications, we attempt to prove the internalities in security market, by both economic analysis and by experiential test. The result may be useful to market supervisors.

作者: Li Xiang Wang Xiaoxu

作者单位: Both of Dongbei University of Finance and Economics

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2011 Academy for Global Business Advancement(AGBAs)8th World Congress(全球商务发展学会第八届国际会议)

会议地点: 大连

会议语种:英文

页码: 23-39

在线出版日期: 2011-09-15（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）