The Control of Moral Hazard in PPP Project Renegotiation

摘要：

The proportion of the renegotiation in PPP (public-private-partnership) projects was gradually increasing year by year, and the presentation of the adverse selection and moral hazard problems were also increasingly prominent. Moral hazard in the renegotiation not only led to the loss of social surplus, but also resulted that both sides could not get their maximum benefit in the long run. Government regulation, public supervision and incentive mechanisms were important factors which affected private enterprises to take opportunistic strategy or cooperative strategy in the renegotiation. After the renegotiation happened, through the qualitative and quantitative analysis on factors relevant of private enterprises’ moral hazard, the government could make response measures related to the maximum degree of inhibition of private enterprises’ moral hazard in the renegotiation.

作者: Xing BI Hong WANG

作者单位: College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2011 IEEE 18th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management(2011 IEEE 第十八届工业工程与工程管理国际会议 IEEM2011)

会议地点: 长春

会议语种:英文

页码: 232-236

在线出版日期: 2011-09-03（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）