A Signal Game Model on Security Defense of Information System

摘要：

With the continuous development of informationization, the issues about information systems security have been plaguing firms. As the security of information systems level is uneven, this paper uses signal game theory to study how different types of firms to maximize their own safety benefits in the case of incomplete information. Then analyze necessary and sufficient condition entirely successful detach Bayesian equilibrium, partly successful pooling Bayesian equilibrium, nearly failing mixed Bayesian equilibrium and corresponding strategies of firms. Finally we propose countermeasures to enhance the overall safety level of firms.

作者: Qiang XIONG Wei-jun ZHONG Shu-e MEI

作者单位: School of Economic and Management, Southeast Univerity, Nanjing, China School of Business Administra School of Economic and Management, Southeast Univerity, Nanjing, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2011 IEEE 18th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management(2011 IEEE 第十八届工业工程与工程管理国际会议 IEEM2011)

会议地点: 长春

会议语种:英文

页码: 299-302

在线出版日期: 2011-09-03（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）