The Pricing Mechanism of The Building Energy Efficiency Services based on Principal-agent Theory

摘要：

Through selecting principal-agent theory to analyze the building energy efficiency services, this paper points out that the current contract pricing process does not fully consider the asymmetric information, there is no rational pricing mechanism adopted to avoid the adverse selection and moral hazard. We find that the specific risk assessment can be analyzed by the dynamic risk-sharing model. The risk assessment is determined by the risk characteristics of different project and the contractors’ risk aversion.

作者: Qi ZHANG Ying-zong LIU

作者单位: Department of Management, Renai College of Tianjin University, Tianjin, China Department of Management, Tianjin University, Tianjin, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2011 IEEE 18th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management(2011 IEEE 第十八届工业工程与工程管理国际会议 IEEM2011)

会议地点: 长春

会议语种:英文

页码: 436-438

在线出版日期: 2011-09-03（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）