Contract Design of CLSC with Recycled Quantity Affected by the Interaction of Recycling Price and Sales Volume

摘要：

On the base of the assumption that the recycled quantity of used products is affected by the interaction of recycling price and sales volume, this paper researches closed-loop supply chains pricing and coordination, gives system members’ optimal pricing and profits in decentralized decision and centralized decision and finds that reverse supply chain itself is in coordination and traditional forward supply chain is in incoordiantion under decentralized decision. Then it designs a revenue sharing contract which can coordinate closed-loop supply chain. At last, a numerical example is given to verify the conclusions drew in this paper.

作者: Wen-jun GAO Ju-hong CHEN

作者单位: School of Economic and Management, Shan Xi Normal University, Lin fen, China School of Economic and School of Economic and Management, Xi’an University of Technology, Xi’an, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2011 IEEE 18th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management(2011 IEEE 第十八届工业工程与工程管理国际会议 IEEM2011)

会议地点: 长春

会议语种:英文

页码: 1446-1449

在线出版日期: 2011-09-03（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）