Value Disruption Information Management in A Supply Chain with Myopic Customers

摘要：

This paper studies a supply chain, in which a supplier wholesales an item to a seller, and the seller competes with a rival for myopic customers. Customers’ value of the sellers product can be disrupted with a certain probability. A hybrid game is used to study this supply chain. Under some conditions, we show that the suppliers value of the disruption information increases with respect to the variance of the disruption, and the suppliers value of the disruption scale information increases with respect to the disruption probability and the variance of the disruption scale.

作者: Wei-gang ZHOU Qian-qian FENG

作者单位: School of Mathematics and Computer Science, Xiangfan University, Xiangyang, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2011 IEEE 18th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management(2011 IEEE 第十八届工业工程与工程管理国际会议 IEEM2011)

会议地点: 长春

会议语种:英文

页码: 1612-1616

在线出版日期: 2011-09-03（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）