Self-enforcing Mechanism for Relational Contract in R&D Based on GNBS

摘要：

economical contract is not very well in R&D, and relational contract is complementary for it. Self-enforcing is key point of relational contract. Repeated game is used in selfenforcing mechanism, while special invest happened before the repeated game. So self-enforcing mechanism based on repeated game could not take effect in R&D. Introduce GNBS and fixed price, build up game frame on foundation of relational contract, analysis the difference of decision in one time trade and in relational contract, put forward the condition in which the partner would choose the best investment. According to this, selfenforcing mechanism for relational contract in R&D is built up.

作者: You Jing

作者单位: Chongqing University of science and technology Chongqing, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: International Conference on Management and Service Science(2011年第五届管理与服务科学国际会议 MASS 2011)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 1-4

在线出版日期: 2011-08-12（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）