Efficient Strategic Bargaining

摘要：

In strategic bargaining, decider feels inequality aversion in 6, fairness affects bargaining efficiency and distribution of bargaining outcomes in 15, but they all leaves tolerance open. It is difficult to explore bargaining outcomes when incorporating tolerance into bargaining structure. In this paper, we consider decider withholding cooperation from proposer even if the proposer mistreated the decider, and explore the proposers force and the deciders deciding power. For self-interested and tolerably fair motivated preferences, we present some results predictable in a perspective of classical game theory. In particular, full efficiency is characterized. Since our bargaining structure incorporates tolerance, this paper extends 6, 15.

作者: Xianhua Dai Hong Li Xing Tong

作者单位: Wuhan Institute of Technology Wuhan, 430205, P.R.China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: International Conference on Management and Service Science(2011年第五届管理与服务科学国际会议 MASS 2011)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 1-3

在线出版日期: 2011-08-12（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）