An Advertising Model of Duopoly with Consumer Searching

摘要：

Aiming at the problem that the Tirole(1997)s analysis of informative advertising ,with the two-phase gaming model applied to it. This paper puts forward the informative advertising model based on consumers information searching in which consumers have heterogeneous preferences, and consumers costs of information searching can influence the product price and advertising level of enterprises. In the discussion of model equilibrium, the conclusions are: when high discovery cost, in equilibrium, duopoly have the same price and advertising level will increase firstly then decrease if the reservation value increases.

作者: Qihong Zhu Feng Gu

作者单位: School of Management Shanghai Lixin University of Shanghai Shanghai,201620, P.R.China Aetna School of Management Shanghai Jiaotong University Shanghai,200030, P.R.China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: International Conference on Management and Service Science(2011年第五届管理与服务科学国际会议 MASS 2011)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 1-3

在线出版日期: 2011-08-12（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）