Chinese Company Managerial Entrenchment Effect Governance and Corporate Debt Maturity Structure Choice

摘要：

This paper deduces: when the current final liquidate residual of a project is greater than the next period of expected revenue, investors will choose short-term debt and take it as supervision on managers; under the corporate debt maturity structure option game equilibrium between managers and shareholders, the higher the corporate governance level, the better the legal system environment, and the lower the corporate debt level, the more effective will be the restrict of management entrenchment effects. In addition, this paper adopts data of Chinese listed companies of 2008-2009 for empirical test, and this empirical results support the theory and assumptions in the paper.

作者: Hu Jie Zhang Dixin

作者单位: Department of Finance School of Business, Nanjing University Nanjing, P.R.China, 21009 School of Fin Peng Ruolan Department of Finance, Department of international economics and trade, School of Busine

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: International Conference on Management and Service Science(2011年第五届管理与服务科学国际会议 MASS 2011)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 1-5

在线出版日期: 2011-08-12（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）