The Analysis on Carbon Emission Strategy of the High Energy Consumption Enterprise Project Considering the Government Supervision
In this paper we introduce the evolutionary game method for the further study on the carbon emission strategy of the high energy consumption enterprise project. The issue of carbon emission of the enterprise project considering the government supervision can be seen as an equilibrium process which includes the game between the enterprise and the government. The boundary rationality of the game participator in social production system made the game process to be a process for the stable state. Based on the model of evolutionary game involving the enterprise and the government, we find that the initial state run a key role on the strategy. And the unstable state strategies have the trend to achieve or degenerate to the perfect or the terrible strategy. And several parameters can be utilized as the locus of control for the governments policy.
Wang Guohong Luo Zhen
School of Management, Dalian University of Technology Dalian, China Luo Zhen School of Management, Dalian University of Technology Dalian, China
国际会议
International Conference on Management and Service Science(2011年第五届管理与服务科学国际会议 MASS 2011)
武汉
英文
1-4
2011-08-12（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）