Agency Costs of Engineering Project Procurement

摘要：

Based on asymmetric information game and principal—agent theory, by analyzing the forming reasons and connotation relationships of agency costs which occurs during the process of engineering project procurement, this paper give out the model of optimal contract and monitoring mechanism. It also analyzes the relationships between the monitoring mechanism and incentive mechanism.

作者: Chen Shouke Wei Zhuobin

作者单位: Dept.Of Logistics Engineering Naval University of Engineering Tianjin, P.R.China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: International Conference on Management and Service Science(2011年第五届管理与服务科学国际会议 MASS 2011)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 1-5

在线出版日期: 2011-08-12（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）