REPUTATION MODEL IN NEWSVENDOR-TYPE SUPPLY CHAIN WITH LONG TERM COOPERATION
With a view to the sustainable development of both supply chain and its members, in this paper, the factor of time is introduced into the principal-agent problem about gaming on moral hazard in newsvendor-type supply chain. Firstly, we define the specific connotation of the reputation of the manufacturer (the principal), and based on which we build the stackelberg game model between the two decision makers in single moral hazard framework on the background of single-period newsvendor problem. We analyze the influence of moral hazard from the manufacturer on the order strategy of the retailer, and testify that the retailers prior judgment on the manufacturers reputation has a positive influence to its order quantity. Thereafter, we extend the game on single period moral hazard to long term cooperation: based on the feature of newsvendor-type supply chain coordination in multi-period game, which refers to “long-term existing multi-period cooperation relationship, constant varying single period game contain, considering the possibility of the retailers misjudging the manufacturers behavior when it makes judgment only according to the actual demand, we build the Manufacturers Reputation Model. This model reveals that the retailers evaluation on the manufacturers reputation and the latters moral change in the same direction.
Zhang Jianjun Zhao Jin Zhao Sheng
Tongji University Shanghai, China Nanchang Hangkong University Nanchang, China
国际会议
International Conference on Management and Service Science(2011年第五届管理与服务科学国际会议 MASS 2011)
武汉
英文
1-5
2011-08-12（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）