Retailers Shelf-Space and Pricing Decisions under Revenue Sharing Contracts
In some retail contexts, retailers can often stimulate product sales by offering a price discount or allocating more shelf or display space. The retailers shelf-space and pricing decisions can affect not only the retailers profitability but also the suppliers profitability. This paper investigates the impact of revenue sharing contracts on the retailers shelf-space and pricing decisions. Consider a two-echelon supply chain with a supplier supplying a certain product to a retailer facing non-linear inventory holding costs and the customer demand that depends on both the price of the product and the shelf space allocated. We firstly provide the equilibrium of the optimal decisions of the retailer and the supplier when no revenue sharing contract is offered. Then we consider the case where the supplier replenishes the retailers shelf under a revenue sharing contract. It is shown that a properly designed revenue sharing contract can increase the profit of the manufacture, comparing to the benchmark case. Finally we conclude that revenue sharing contracts still can not coordinate the supply chain.
Manyun Tan Hexin Wang
School of Economics and Management Beihang University Beijing,China
国际会议
International Conference on Management and Service Science(2011年第五届管理与服务科学国际会议 MASS 2011)
武汉
英文
1-4
2011-08-12（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）