Bidding Strategy in Takeover

摘要：

The paper models the toehold acquisition and bid price decision problem faced by bidders in takeovers. The model builds upon the model of takeover proposed by Grossman and Hart (1980) and its later extensions by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) , Hirshleifer and Titman (1990) and Chowdhry and Jegadeesh (1994). By allowing the firm value to decrease after a failed tender offer, I find that the bidder with greater improvement of target firm value will overbid while low value enhancing bidder will not. In this sense, I provide an explanation for the overbidding behavior in takeover of only one bidder.

作者: Ping Jiang

作者单位: School of International Trade and Economics University of International Business and Economics 10 huixin dongjie,chaoyang,Beijing, China,100029

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: International Conference on Management and Service Science(2011年第五届管理与服务科学国际会议 MASS 2011)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 1-4

在线出版日期: 2011-08-12（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）