An Investigation of the Relationship among Tunneling,Asymmetric Information and Discount of Private Placement:Evidence from China

摘要：

The paper develops a model of private placement, then explores the discount of private placement under the control of controlling shareholder and how to influence companys value. We find that private placement is used to a mechanism for tunneling, Whether and how much to tunnel may depend on the discount and the percentage of private placement which purchased by the controlling shareholder. At the same time, asymmetric information has an important influence on the discount of private placement, and the discount is larger when it exists more asymmetric information.

作者: GUO Si-yong

作者单位: Shanghai Lixin University of Commerce,Add.:The School of Accounting and Finance,2800 Wenxiang Road Shanghai Songjiang University Park .Shanghai P.R.China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: International Conference on Management and Service Science(2011年第五届管理与服务科学国际会议 MASS 2011)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 1-4

在线出版日期: 2011-08-12（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）