Study on the Collusive Corruption in Supervision and Examination of Bank Credit

摘要：

Commercial banks are typical hierarchical organizations, in which the multiple-principal-agent problem exists and induces serious internal collusive corruption. This article analyzes the collusive corruption between the credit supervisor and the credit manager in bank credit activities, through three possible situations of supervision and examination, including honest and costly supervisor alone, corrupt and costless supervisor alone, and the coexistence of both supervisors. The results of this paper indicate that it is still necessary for the internal supervisor to provide the supervision even though he could collude. Meanwhile, it is inefficient for the bank only depending on the costly external supervisor. Finally, some suggestions are also proposed.

作者: Xu-guang Nan Meng-Chun Kao

作者单位: Chongqing Radio and TV University Chongqing 400052, P.R.China Department of Finance, Yuanpei University Hsinchu 30015, Taiwan, R.O.C

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: International Conference on Management and Service Science(2011年第五届管理与服务科学国际会议 MASS 2011)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 1-4

在线出版日期: 2011-08-12（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）