Research on Corporate Governance and Constraint Mechanism of Over-Investment Behavior by Listed Companies
Possible factors to constrain Chinas over-investment have been analyzed and related assumptions been proposed. The behavior of over-investment of the listed companies in China and strategies of its constraint mechanism have been analyzed carefully by constructing related models on the basis of previous experience and the actual situation and by an empirical analysis with collected data in 2006-2008 from Chinas listed companies of A share as the study sample. The following results have been obtained from the analysis: (1) Some listed companies in China commit over-investment and the amount of over-investment shows a positive correlation with the flow of the companys free cash; (2) Over-investment by the listed companies could have been effectively restricted if there were some big non-state shareholders, or independent directors or managers owned some shares of the company; (3) The largest share proportion by the shareholders, equity concentration, ownership restriction, separation of chairman and general manager, and Managers executive compensation salaries did not effectively restrict companies investment behavior. Our findings have important implications for restricting over-investment and for corporate governance.
Bi Qian Luo Hong
College of Economics and Management Southwest University Chongqing 400716
国际会议
International Conference on Management and Service Science(2011年第五届管理与服务科学国际会议 MASS 2011)
武汉
英文
1-4
2011-08-12（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）