Dynamic Analysing on Cooperative Innovation with Simple Imitating and Training

摘要：

The cooperative innovation is somewhat a prisoners dilemma. If enterprises of an innovation game have the static dominant rationality, the game will get a result called dominant equilibrium,no one wants to innovate. To walk out of the dilemma, players should change either environment or themselves. Game trainers cant use infinite repeated training to effect learners. Training should be limitted and training behaviour may change according to the game context.

作者: ZHAND Deng-bing

作者单位: College of Economics and Management Yancheng Institute of Technology Jiansu Yancheng,China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: International Conference on Management and Service Science(2011年第五届管理与服务科学国际会议 MASS 2011)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 1-4

在线出版日期: 2011-08-12（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）