First-Price Auctions With Risk-Averse Bidders

摘要：

We consider first-price auctions with asymmetric independent private values and risk-averse bidders. We show that a bidders expected equilibrium equilibrium bid strategy satisfies that her utility identically equal to her accumulated expected marginal utility. For symmetric first-price auctions with weakly risk-averse bidders, we give the explicit approximation expression of the equilibrium bid strategies by a perturbation method, by which we figure out the sellers expected revenue and each bidders expected equilibrium utility.

作者: Sen Yang Xianjia Wang Jian jiao

作者单位: Institute of Systems Engineering, Wuhan University Wuhan, China School of Econimics and Managemenet, Wuhan University Wuhan, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: International Conference on Management and Service Science(2011年第五届管理与服务科学国际会议 MASS 2011)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 1-4

在线出版日期: 2011-08-12（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）