The Empirical Research on the Performance of Stock Options Incentive

摘要：

The issue of the separation of ownership from control and the alignment of management and shareholder via the managerial ownership of equity remain the key topic of Chinese listed companies. Through the empirical study, this paper reveals that the managerial shareholding has no effect on management performance. The fundamental resolution to get the stock option incentive work in China is to set up a reasonable ownership structure and an effective capital market.

作者: Hu Haxia Wang Jue

作者单位: School of Management Wuhan University of Technology Wuhan, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2011 International Conference on Product Innovation Management(第六届产品创新管理国际会议)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 75-78

在线出版日期: 2011-07-16（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）