Research on Supply Chain Contract Design under Information-sharing
In this paper, a two-stage supply chain was used as the object to analyze the changes of supply chain efficiency and effectiveness before and after information sharing, while the influence of the shortage cost was considered. Based on cooperative game of the two sides after information sharing, the supply chain contract systems and its contract parameter design models were provided for enterprises to practice easily. This study shows that after information sharing, the supplier can use supply chain contracts to improve the supply chain efficiency and effectiveness, and increase the profits of the partners; if the two sides share the inventory risk costs, the combinations of the inventory transfer price and the inventory risk cost coefficient shared by the supplier must satisfy a condition to ensure that the profit combination of the supply chain is a Pareto improvement; if the two sides share the costs and profits, the supplier can use the Rubinstein model to determine the profit sharing coefficient, and improve the efficiency of contract design.
HE Kailun LIANG Weihua
School of Business Administration Chongqing University of Technology Chongqing city, China China Logistic Corporation China Chengtong Holdings Group Ltd Beijing city, China
国际会议
2011 International Conference on Product Innovation Management(第六届产品创新管理国际会议)
武汉
英文
98-102
2011-07-16（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）