Special Agents can Promote Cooperation
Cooperation possesses a very signi cant role on the development of human being societies and animal colonies. Understanding the emergence of cooperation is a central topic in the study of multi-agent systems.The Prisoners Dilemma proposes a question to us,how the emergence of cooperation occurs in the population of sel sh agents without centralized control.Previous work mainly focus on the design of dynamics in the speci c system,or say the playing rule in game theory. However at some circumstances,it is impossible for the original system to run according to the new rule.This paper incorporates the idea of intervention into the evolution of cooperation at the premise of not changing the playing rule in the original system. With the introduction of a small proportion of special agents,the level of cooperation is increased signi cantly.In the meantime, this mechanism is robust to the plausible noise existing in the evolution.
WANG Xin HAN Jing
Key Laboratory of Systems and Control,Institute of Systems Science Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science,Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100190,P.R.China
国际会议
The 30th Chinese Control Conference(第三十届中国控制会议)
烟台
英文
1-5
2011-07-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）